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Lawrence v. Texas: Does This Mean
Increased Privacy Rights for Gay
and Lesbian Teachers?
Suzanne Eckes
Martha McCarthy

This article addresses the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in
Lawrence v. Texas and its implications for the rights of gay and
lesbian public school teachers. The authors provide a context by
reviewing the teacher role-model theory, traditional standards used in
dismissals for immoral conduct, and pre-Lawrence cases regarding
public employees' privacy rights. Then they analyze Lawrence v.
Texas, which struck down a Texas law imposing criminal penalties
for persons of the same sex engaging in certain sexual conduct. The
final section explores implications of the expanded liberty right
announced in Lawrence for public school teachers and their lifestyle
choices.

Introduction
There cannot be two sets of ethical principles, or two forms of ethical theory,
one for life in the school and the other for life outside of the school, as conduct
is one, the principles of conduct are also one. (Hooker, 1995, p. 3)

Throughout history, teachers have been dismissed for immoral conduct that
occurs both in and out of school. In the past, school authorities tried to
discharge teachers because of pregnancy or even divorce (Littlejohn v. Rose,
1985; Ponton v. Newport, 1986). School districts have also attempted to
dismiss teachers because of their sexual orientation (Gaylord v. Tacoma,
1977; Rowland v. Mad River School, 1984). Most states have statutes
regulating the grounds for teacher dismissal, under which teachers may be
dismissed for "immorality" or for the conviction of a crime including "moral
turpitude." To the extent these statutes attempt to regulate teachers' private
conduct, however, some questions remain as to whether these statutes violate
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a teacher's constitutional right to privacy (Trebilcock, 2000). The Supreme
Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), although not
specifically addressing the issue of teacher dismissal, may provide some
insight and guidelines regarding a teacher's privacy rights.
This article addresses the potential impact of the Lawrence v. Texas
decision on gay and lesbian public school teachers. First, it provides a brief
overview of how public school teachers have been considered role models
for students and thus could be disciplined or dismissed for immoral
conduct. Next, the paper explores pre-Lawrence cases regarding public
employees' right to privacy. Finally, the article provides an analysis of the
Lawrence v. Texas decision and discusses implications the decision may
have for public school teachers.
The Teacher as a Role Model for Students
Throughout history, "the school teacher has traditionally been regarded as
a moral example for the students" (Board of Education v. Wood, 1986, p.
839). One court noted that "We are aware of the special position occupied
by a teacher in our society. As a consequence of that elevated stature, a
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teacher's actions are subject to much greater scrutiny than that given to the
activities of the average person" (Chicago Board of Education v. Payne,
1981, p. 748). As such, public school teachers are generally held to a
higher standard of behavior than the general public because of their close
relationships with students (Adams v. State Professional Practices Council,
1981). In 1979, the Supreme Court observed:
A teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but
important influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through both
the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has
an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government,
the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities. This influence
is crucial to the continued good health of a democracy. (Ambach v.
Norwick, 1979, p. 77)

The standards to judge a teacher's private behavior have always varied
across jurisdictions. Courts have taken the position that, although schools
are designed to prepare students to participate in the national political and
democratic process, they should also be a reflection of their communities.
That is, the values a school chooses to embrace may very well depict the
community in which the school is situated. Of course, this means that there
is no single standard for assessing teacher conduct. It is also important to
note that a community's standard cannot violate an individual's
constitutional rights (Ambach v. Norwick, 1979). In other words, while a
public school teacher may serve as a role model, it is well-settled law that
the government may not require a teacher to shed his or her constitutional
rights to retain a government position (Perry v. Sinderman, 1972).
Immorality is a legitimate cause for dismissing a teacher, and in the past,
gay and lesbian teachers' conduct has been considered immoral under
some community standards (Walden & Culverhouse, 1989).1 The key issue
in such cases is how far teachers' privacy rights extend.
The Right To Privacy
The individual's right to privacy has been recognized as far back as 1890.
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis acknowledged the existence of a right
to privacy when they helped to establish that each individual has a
cognizable legal interest in a private life. For example, while on the
Supreme Court, Justice Brandeis argued that the Fourth Amendment
insures that the government does not intrude into the "privacy of the
individual" (Trebilcock, 2000, p. 450). Justice Brandeis consistently took
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the position that one's private life should be free from government
intrusion.
In addition to the Fourth Amendment argument supported by Justice
Brandeis, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that "no person be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law" (U.S. Const.
Amend. XIV, 1). Although the Constitution makes no direct reference to
the existence of a right to privacy, it is a right implied in the concept of
personal liberty embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment (Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 1992).2 The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause's substantive component derives mainly from the interpretation of
the term "liberty." As a result, certain types of government limits on
individual conduct have been held to unreasonably interfere with important
individual rights to the extent that they amount to an unreasonable denial
of "liberty." Accordingly, there are certain protected zones of privacy
where the government should not interfere, regardless of the government
interest asserted.
The U.S. Supreme Court has extended this zone of privacy in several
cases. In 1965, the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut allowed married
couples access to contraception, and in 1972 it extended the ruling to
unmarried couples in Eisenstadt v. Baird. In both Griswold and Eisenstadt,
the Court recognized constitutional protection of a privacy right in private
sexual activity. In 1973, the right of privacy was also articulated to protect
a woman's right to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade. In contrast, a 1986
decision, Bowers v. Hardwick, did not extend this privacy right to include
all private sexual activity when the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia antisodomy statute.
Given this zone of privacy, the courts have attempted to balance the
school board's interests in safeguarding the welfare of students and the
teacher's right to privacy. For example, a teacher can be terminated based
on evidence that would not be sufficient to support criminal charges, but
teacher discipline or dismissal cannot occur solely because school officials
disapprove of teachers' personal and private conduct (Montefusco v.
Nassau County, 1999). Also, teachers cannot be dismissed for
unsubstantiated rumors about their private activities (Peaster Independent
School District v. Glodfelty, 2001). However, restrictions can be placed on
unconventional behavior that is detrimental to job performance or harmful
to students.
Despite the guidance provided by the Supreme Court regarding privacy
rights, public school teachers' privacy rights have not been clearly
delineated, so teacher lifestyle cases have been decided on a case-by-case
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basis. As such, school boards have continued to discipline or dismiss
teachers for actions pertaining to their lives outside of the classroom, and
in response, teachers have challenged school officials' authority to restrict
personal lifestyle choices.

Pre-Lawrence Decisions
Prior to 2003, lower courts rendered a range of opinions regarding public
employees' privacy rights. The recent trend has been to require a nexus
between the lifestyle choice and ability to perform the job, but courts have
differed in defining the type of nexus required.
Cases Regarding Marriage and Pregnancy
Lower courts have been reluctant to support dismissal actions based on
marital status and pregnancy. The courts' reluctance has been based on
their recognition that decisions pertaining to marriage and parenthood
involve constitutionally protected privacy rights. To illustrate, the Fifth
Circuit found a Mississippi school district's rule of prohibiting the
employment of unwed parents to promote a "properly moral scholastic
environment" to be a violation of equal protection and due process despite
the school district's argument that unwed parents were improper
communal role models (Andrews v. Drew, 1975, p. 614). Similarly,
compelled leaves of absence for pregnant, unmarried employees have been
invalidated as violating constitutional privacy rights. For example, at least
one court has held that offering a teacher parental leave without guarantee
of her position upon return violates the teacher's constitutional and
statutory rights (Ponton v. Newport News School Board, 1986).
Courts generally have also reasoned that public employees have a
privacy right to engage in consenting sexual relationships regardless of
their marital status; such relationships would have to impair teaching
effectiveness to be the basis for dismissal. For example, the Supreme Court
of Iowa held that a teacher's adulterous relationship provided insufficient
grounds to justify revocation of his teaching certificate because the
relationship did not severely impact his employment (Erb v. Iowa, 1974).
The court noted that the mere fact that a teacher admitted adultery was not
enough to prove his inability to teach. Specifically, the court reasoned that
"the personal moral views of the board members cannot be relevant" (p.
343). Similarly, a Florida court overturned a school board's termination of
a teacher for lacking good moral character based on a personal romantic
relationship (Sherburne v. School Board, 1984). The court held that the
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teacher's cohabitation did not have an adverse effect on her ability to teach.
Also, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a school board's nonrenewal of a
teacher's contract based on her involvement in a divorce violated her
constitutional privacy rights (Littlejohn v. Rose, 1985). In this case, the
court disagreed with the parents who argued that there was disruption
because there were too many divorced teachers teaching in the public
school. In finding for the teacher, the court relied on the constitutional right
to privacy that precludes dismissal of a teacher seeking divorce.
Some courts, however, have upheld dismissals or other disciplinary
actions based on public employees' adulterous relationships. In a non school
case, the Fifth Circuit upheld disciplinary action against two police officers
for their off-duty dating and alleged cohabitation (Shawgo v. Spradlin,
1983). The court reasoned that the officer's conduct could bring public
attention that could result in unfavorable criticism of the police department.
Also, the Texas Supreme Court held that constitutional rights were not
violated when a police officer was denied promotion for having an affair
with another officer's wife (City ofSherman v. Henry, 1996).

Cases Regarding Homosexuality
When determining employment decisions based on a teacher's sexual
orientation, the courts will generally consider the notoriety surrounding the
conduct, whether the homosexual conduct was public or private in nature,
and its overall impact on teaching abilities. Specifically, courts will require
a nexus between private homosexuality and impaired teaching
effectiveness in order justify dismissal. Of course, if teachers engage in
public sexual activity whether homosexual or heterosexual, they can be
dismissed for immorality (Morgan v. State Board ofEducation, 2002).
Dismissals of public school employees based solely on sexual
orientation, in the absence of criminal charges, have evoked a range of
judicial interpretations (Boy Scouts of American v. Dale, 2000). The
Morrison v. Board of Education (1969) and the Gaylord v. Tacoma (1977)
decisions provide a partiCUlarly good illustration of the range of judicial
interpretations in this area of law. In Morrison, a male teacher (Morrison)
had a homosexual relationship with another public school teacher,
Schneringer. A year after the consensual sexual relationship, Schneringer
informed the district of their one-week long sexual relationship. Morrison
resigned from his position and the State Board of Education later
determined that the sexual incident "constituted immoral and
unprofessional conduct, and an act involving moral turpitude, all of which
warrant revocation of life diplomas" (p. 219). The Board's decision was
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later overturned by the Supreme Court of California, which held that under
the statute teachers could only be dismissed for immorality or moral
turpitude if it rendered the individual unfit to teach. In so doing, the court
ordered that Morrison's certificate be restored because the school board
failed to demonstrate that Morrison was unfit to teach. The Supreme Court
of California laid out the following set of guidelines to help determine
when a teacher is unfit to teach:
1. The likelihood that the conduct would adversely affect students or
fellow teachers;
2. The degree of such adversity anticipated;
3. The proximity or remoteness in time of the conduct;
4. The type of teaching certificate held by the party involved;
5. The extenuating circumstance surrounding the conduct;
6. The praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of the motives resulting
in the conduct;
7. The likelihood of the recurrence of the conduct; and
8. The extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an adverse
impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights of the
teacher involved or other teachers.
As such, the Morrison court held that when immorality is "used in a statute
it is inseparable from 'conduct'" (p. 224) and that the conduct must
adversely affect the teacher's fitness to perform.
Contrary to the Supreme Court of California's decision in Morrison,
the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a dismissal of a homosexual
teacher based on mere knowledge of the teacher's sexual orientation in
Gaylord v. Tacoma (1977). Gaylord had been a teacher for 12 years in
Tacoma where he had received superior teaching evaluations. After his
homosexuality became public knowledge, the school board argued that the
students' knowledge of his sexual orientation would impair his ability to
teach. The school cited fear, confusion, suspicion, and parental concern as
justification of the dismissal. The Gaylord court agreed, holding that
school boards need not wait for "overt expressions of homosexual conduct
before they act to prevent harm" (p. 1347). Although the school failed to
provide any evidence that the teacher's homosexuality would be disruptive
in the classroom, the court reasoned that homosexuality is inherently
immoral. Based on this conclusion, the court reasoned that public
knowledge of a teacher's homosexual conduct could lead to notoriety of
such a nature that the teacher could no longer perform classroom activities.
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Similar to Gaylord, other courts have upheld dismissals based on mere
knowledge of a teacher's homosexuality, which suggests that such
knowledge is sufficient to establish an impairment of teaching
effectiveness that overrides any protected privacy interest. Specifically in
Sixth Circuit and Ninth Circuit cases, sexual orientation appeared to be the
reason public educators were dismissed, despite the inability to show the
required nexus of notoriety and classroom disruption. In Rowland v. Mad
River Local School District (1984), a guidance counselor's contract was
not renewed after she revealed her sexual orientation to adult employees at
the school. The Sixth Circuit found that because she did not have tenure,
there was no expectancy of employment and her dismissal was upheld. In
an earlier case, Burton v. Cascade School District (1975), a non-tenured
teacher was dismissed after adult school employees learned of the teacher's
sexual orientation. The Ninth Circuit did not reinstate Burton for the same
reason mentioned in Rowland.
The Tenth Circuit upheld an Oklahoma statute that allowed school
boards to terminate teachers for engaging in public homosexual activity
(National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, 1984). The court,
however, did find the part of the statute that allowed "punishment" of
teachers for public homosexual conduct to be unconstitutional.
Additionally, the court struck down the portion of the law authorizing the
dismissal or nonrenewal of teachers for advocating public or private
homosexuality; this part of the statute was found overbroad because it
sought to regulate free speech rights. Finally, the court noted that under the
statute, the school district would be required to show a connection between
the teacher's ability to teach and the teacher's speech. In another case, a
New York federal court upheld the termination of a teacher for actively
participating in the North American ManIBoy Love Association
(NAMBLA), a group supporting consensual sexual activity between men
and boys. The court reasoned that the teacher's activities in NAMBLA
were likely to impair his effectiveness as a teacher and would cause
internal disruption in the classroom (Melzer v. Board ofEducation, 2002).
Likewise, in other recent lower court cases, the judicial decisions have
been mixed. For example, the Utah Federal District Court held that the
community's negative reaction to a teacher's homosexuality did not justify
the removal of the teacher as the girl's volleyball coach. The court also
held that the school district could not instruct her not to mention her
"homosexual orientation or lifestyle" to students, parents, or staff (Weaver
v. Nebo School District, 1998, p. 1285). The Court noted that the teacher's
homosexuality and the community's negative response to it did not furnish
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a rational job-related basis for her removal. Also, when an Ohio federal
court found that a teacher was not renewed because of his sexual
orientation rather than for his teaching deficiencies as the school board
asserted, the court awarded the teacher reinstatement, back pay, and
damages (Glover v. Williamsburg, 1998).
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit upheld revocation ofa public
employee's job offer after her employer, the Attorney General of the State
of Georgia, learned of the employee's upcoming same-sex marriage. The
employment action was based on her illegal wedding ceremony rather than
the fact that she was a lesbian. The attorney general contended that the
same-sex marriage would interfere with the inability to enforce the state's
sodomy law and would create an appearance of conflicting interpretations
of state law. The employee brought an action claiming violation of her
rights of intimate and expressive association, freedom of religion, equal
protection and substantive due process. The court found that the interests
of the employer outweighed the employee's constitutional interests
(Shahar v. Bowers, 1997). Specifically, the court reasoned that the position
required that the attorney exercise good judgment and needed to maintain
her employer's trust. The attorney general argued that the plaintiff's
intimate associational rights were subordinate to the employer's interest in
the effective functioning of the government office.
As mentioned, prior to 2003, the Supreme Court had rendered only one
decision pertaining to private sexual activity involving sodomy. In Bowers
v. Hardwick (1986), a Georgia law criminalizing public or private
consensual sodomy resulted in a widely publicized decision. In this case,
an individual challenged the law's constitutionality after being criminally
charged for committing sodomy with an adult male in the privacy of his
home. The Court in a five-to-four ruling found a rational basis in
legislation reflecting the citizenry's view that sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable. Declaring that homosexuals have no constitutional right to
engage in sodomy, the Court majority focused its opinion on the
homosexual nature of the conduct at issue, even though the law's
prohibition applies to heterosexual sodomy as well. In upholding sodomy
laws, the Court also noted that there is no American tradition of accepting
homosexual conduct. In so doing, the Court did not hold that
homosexuality was a crime or that homosexuality was immoral, only that
the sexual conduct could be prohibited. Given this holding, states could
continue to use certain conduct, such as sodomy, as a ground for dismissal
of public employees, including teachers (Walden & Culverhouse, 1989).
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This decision was relied on as precedent until 2003, even though criminal
sanctions for private sodomy have not generally been enforced.

Lawrence v. Texas: Increased Privacy Rights for
Homosexuals
In 2003 the Supreme Court rendered a significant decision in Lawrence v.
Texas, striking down a Texas law that imposed criminal penalties if two
persons of the same sex engage in certain sexual conduct. The state appeals
court had found Bowers controlling in rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment
challenge to the law by two men who were arrested and convicted of
deviate sexual intercourse in violation of the Texas law.
The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the law violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Disagreeing with the
conclusion of the Bowers Court and its failure to comprehend the scope of
the individual liberty interest involved, the Lawrence majority (2003)
noted that the Texas law touches on the most private area of human
behavior-sexual conduct-in the most private place, one's home. In
overturning Bowers, the Court clearly enunciated that private, consensual
sexual behavior in the privacy of the home is constitutionally protected and
cannot be the basis for a crime. The Court found that "adults may choose
to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons" (Lawrence v.
Texas, 2003, p. 2478). The Court declared that "Bowers was not correct
when it was decided, and it is not correct today" (p. 2484).
The Court majority reviewed the Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe cases
which, as discussed, found protected liberty rights under the Due Process
Clause in areas such as marriage, procreation, and child rearing.
Specifically, the Court noted that the "pertinent beginning point" for its
holding in Lawrence was Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and recognized
that after Griswold, the right to make decisions regarding sexual conduct
extends beyond the marital relationship. In discussing Eisenhardt, the
Court reiterated that "if the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as
the decision whether to bear or beget a child" (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p.
2477). The Lawrence majority noted that these cases provided the context
for the widely publicized decision legalizing abortions, Roe v. Wade
(1973). The Court also cited its 1977 ruling striking down a New York law
forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to persons under 16 years of
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age as support for the principle that Fourteenth Amendment liberty rights
extend beyond the rights of married adults (Carey v. Population Services
International, 1977).
In 2003, only 13 states had laws criminalizing sodomy, whereas 25
states had such laws at the time of Bowers, and all 50 states outlawed
sodomy as late as 1961 (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 2474). Yet, at the
time of the Lawrence ruling, just four states enforced their laws solely
against homosexual conduct.
The Lawrence majority cited two post-Bowers cases as eroding the
foundation of the Bowers holding. Reaffirming the right to have an
abortion, the Court observed in Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) that
"matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may
make in a lifetime ... are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment" (p. 851). The Court subsequently struck down an amendment
to Colorado's Constitution that deprived a class of citizens who were
homosexuals, lesbians, or bisexual any protections under state
antidiscrimination laws (Romer v. Evans, 1996). The Lawrence majority
also noted that the European Court of Human Rights had invalidated laws
proscribing private, consensual homosexmil conduct under the European
Convention on Human Rights.
In addition to relying on prior case law regarding privacy rights, the
Court also discussed the historical evolution of sodomy prohibitions when
it overruled Bowers. In so doing, the Lawrence Court concluded that the
Court in Bowers overstated the historical grounds for prohibiting
homosexual conduct. The Court reasoned that there was no prohibition of
sodomy during colonial times and that it was not until the late Nineteenth
Century that the concept of homosexuality became a distinct category.
From a historical perspective, American sodomy law was used to prohibit
nonprocreative sexual activity generally rather than only homosexual
activity. The Court further noted that laws prohibiting sodomy do not seem
to have been enforced against consenting adults in private. This historical
perspective is contrary to the Bowers holding, which indicated that there
was no American tradition of accepting sodomy.
Justice O'Connor concurred that the Texas law should be invalidated,
but she disagreed that Bowers should be overruled (Lawrence v. Texas,
2003). She based her conclusion that the Texas law should be struck down
on the Equal Protection Clause, since the Texas law banned only same-sex
sodomy. She concluded that moral disapproval is not a legitimate state
interest to justify bans on homosexual, but not heterosexual, sodomy.
Although indicating support for a "more searching form of rational basis
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review" under the Equal Protection Clause, she found that the Texas law
could not withstand scrutiny under the lenient rational basis standard (p.
2485). She noted that when the state criminalizes conduct that is part of the
homosexual lifestyle, homosexual persons become vulnerable to
government discrimination in all aspects of their lives. While the Lawrence
majority recognized that the equal protection argument was tenable, it
chose Due Process grounds. If the Court deemed homosexuality a suspect
class, the protections would be very broad in that any governmental action
based on an individual's sexual orientation would be subject to the highest
level of judicial scrutiny.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
devoted much of his lengthy dissent to arguing that if the majority's
reasoning is valid in overturning Bowers-this justification should be
applied to overturn Roe v. Wade as well. Indeed, he argued that overturning
Bowers is a "massive disruption of the current social order," whereas
overruling Roe would not be as it would simply return the decision on
legalizing abortions to the states where it was prior to Roe (Lawrence v.
Texas, 2003, p. 2491). He further noted that all laws reflect essentially
moral choices, and asserted that laws against bigamy, same-sex marriages,
prostitution, and many other crimes would be vulnerable to attack under
the majority's reasoning. According to Justice Scalia, only fundamental
rights "deeply rooted in the nation's history and tradition" (p. 2489) should
be subjected to more than rational basis scrutiny under the substantive due
process doctrine. Like many other laws regulating sexual behavior, Justice
Scalia argued that the Texas law had a rational basis and should have been
upheld.
He contended that the Lawrence ruling cannot be reconciled with
federal policy requiring the discharge of members of the armed forces that
engage in homosexual acts or with the Supreme Court's decision holding
that the Boy Scouts have a constitutional right to prohibit homosexuals
from becoming Scout leaders (10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(I), 2003; Boy Scouts of
American v. Dale, 2000). Interestingly, in lamenting the far reaching
implications of the Lawrence ruling, Justice Scalia built a strong case to
support the future use of the majority's rationale to legalize same-sex
marriages. He asserted that if moral disapproval of homosexual conduct
cannot justify the Texas law, then what justification could there possibly be
for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples exercising "the
liberty protected by the Constitution" (p. 2498)?
Justice Thomas endorsed Justice Scalia's dissent, but wrote separately.
He felt that the Texas legislature should repeal the "silly" law (Lawrence v.
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Texas, 2003, p. 2498). However, without such legislative action, he found
nothing in the Constitution that created a general right of privacy that
would invalidate the Texas law.

Implications
The Lawrence decision has recognized a new zone of privacy. Before
Lawrence, engaging in sodomy was illegal in some states, so arguably a
teacher's conduct in this regard could be considered immoral. Thus, the
most obvious implication of the Lawrence decision would be that because
it is no longer illegal for consenting adults to engage privately in sodomy,
teachers will no longer be dismissed for such "criminal conduct." Before
Lawrence, schools would attempt to strike a balance between the teacher's
privacy rights and the interests of the school. As such, a less obvious
implication relates to the question of whether the employers' interests can
outweigh constitutional privacy rights of homosexual employees after
Lawrence?
In lower court teacher lifestyle cases, the courts have required schools
to demonstrate a "nexus" in that the teacher's behavior must adversely
affect the school or reduce teaching effectiveness in the classroom before
sanctions can be imposed (Golden v. Board of Education, 1981; Jefferson
Union v. Jones, 1972; Waugh v. Board of Cabell County, 1986). Courts
have found a nexus to justify adverse action if the two following
circumstances are met: (a) the conduct directly affects the performance of
the responsibilities of the teacher; or (b) if, without contribution on the part
of school officials, the conduct becomes the subject of such notoriety as to
significantly impair the ability of the teacher to discharge the
responsibilities of the teaching position (Jerry v. Board of Education,
1974). Under this standard, evidence of a substantial 'community outcry'
can provide the required nexus to dismiss the teacher if the notoriety
impacts teaching abilities (Sullivan v. Meade, 1976).
The Lawrence ruling raises questions about the continued vitality of
these earlier decisions, given the Court's recognition of increased privacy
rights. In other words, could a teacher still be dismissed if the school
demonstrates this causal nexus? For example, if a teacher appears on a
national talk show promoting her lesbian lifestyle and her community
believes that she is unfit to teach because of her recent notoriety-what
would be the result in light of Lawrence? Justice Kennedy wrote for the
Lawrence majority that the "central holding in Bowers ... demeans the
lives of homosexual persons" (p. 2482). Arguably, after Lawrence, even if
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a nexus exists, the teacher should not be dismissed in this situation, as it
would demean the life a lesbian teacher and invade her privacy.
Yet, the Court in Lawrence did not directly address the issue of a
nexus and disruption in the workplace, so additional litigation will be
necessary to identify the type of impact on teaching effectiveness and
school operations necessary to justify disciplinary action. Despite this
silence in Lawrence, perhaps lower courts will be reluctant to support
dismissal actions based on notoriety involving sexual orientation in the
same way the courts have been reluctant to support dismissal actions based
on marital status and pregnancy. Gay and lesbian teachers are more
optimistic than they were prior to Lawrence regarding the potential success
of legal challenges to employment decisions based on their sexual
orientation, but it remains to be seen how lower courts will interpret the
scope oftheir constitutionally protected privacy rights.

Notes
1

2

In a 1999 public opinion poll parents were asked if "school boards ought to have
the right to fire teachers who are known homosexuals." Twenty percent of the
parents completely agreed, 12% mostly agreed, 26% agreed, 36% completely
disagreed, and 6% did not know (Public Opinion Online, 1999).
After Casey, a woman still has a constitutionally protected privacy interest in
choosing to have an abortion; however, the state has the right to regulate the
abortion process. Such regulations may not place an undue burden on the
woman.
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